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INTRODUCTION
Many jurisdictions have attempted to reform the policies
and rules by which surface water and groundwater are
allocated, either in isolation or as part of an integrated
watershed management initiative.  Importantly, this
includes the set of policy changes designed to establish
the use of market-based instruments to replace
command-and-control policy regimes.  Where a set of
proposed changes deviates significantly from prior
practice, either on a one-time basis or through its
operation over time, this can give rise to windfall gains or
losses to landowners, to water users, and to related third
parties.  At issue in this paper is whether, and in what
ways, a legislative or Constitutional requirement for
public compensation of regulation-related capital losses
would help or hinder the pursuit of economic efficiency.
This paper explores these questions by first indicating
when water policy reform might give rise to a claim for
compensation due to a taking.  Then the paper provides
a conceptual framework that characterizes the takings
provision as a specific constraint on policy-makers'
attempts to pursue economic efficiency through resource
policy reform.  Importantly, the constraint can be satisfied
not only by providing monetary compensation, but by
providing any of a series of related policy changes that
both increase resource rents to landowners)providing
compensation-in-kind)and increase the efficiency of
resource use.  These points are made by drawing on
illustrative examples based on the current groundwater
and surface water allocation policies of Alberta, Canada.
WILL WATER RE-ALLOCATION REPRESENT A
TAKING?
The premise of this paper is that the social objective of
regulatory reform in water allocation is primarily an
efficiency objective, set against a trend of water quality
deterioration and growing water shortages and
misallocation.  These changes are driven by economic
growth, climatic change, and other factors.  However,
where a set of proposed regulatory or policy reforms
deviates significantly from prior practice this can give
rise to capital gains or losses to landowners, to water
users, and to related third parties.  Especially in
jurisdictions that do not have well developed water
markets and institutions, the effects of regulatory change
affecting water will capitalized into the market value of
the lands where the water could be used. 
In the United States, regulation-related capital losses by
landowners might represent "regulatory takings" and, if
so, under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
could require just compensation to injured landowners.
To a lay observer, it appears as though the U.S. Supreme
Court's application of the takings clause has become
broader in recent years, where the Court's decisions have
provided new insights on the issue of when a regulatory
action might be considered a taking.  Innes (1995)
provides an economist's survey of recent Supreme Court
decisions1 and illustrates how the takings clause has been
applied in each.
The courts might find certain types of changes in water
law are not takings, and that there is no legal obligation
that compensation be paid.  This could arise if the
purpose of the changes were the protection of a public
resource (or prevention of a related nuisance); if the
changes made were applicable to all properties that are
similarly situated; if there were a clear connection (a
so-called "essential nexus") between the regulatory
changes and the intended resource protection; and, if
there existed some "rough proportionality" between the
private costs an individual landowner were asked to bear
and the external or social costs that his or her unregulated
actions would have generated (Innes, 1995).
Conversely, other types of water law changes might be
found to be takings if they were not to satisfy all of these
criteria, or if they were to deny uses of land and water
that a land owner should reasonably have expected to
pursue (Innes, 1995:5).  For example, a regulatory change
that was a thinly disguised attempt at rent or resource
extraction for some unspecified public purpose could give
rise to an "inverse condemnation" action; that is, to a
claim for public compensation due to a regulatory taking.
It is not the purpose of this paper to interpret or to second
guess the future actions of courts or law makers on the
issue of when regulatory reform of water allocations
would or would not represent a taking that gives rise to
claims for public compensation.  Let it suffice to
acknowledge that in the current U.S. legal environment,
some types of potential regulatory reform of water usage
would not be exempted from legal challenge nor from
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liability to pay such compensation.  One might equally
acknowledge that U.S. legislative proposals brought
forward as part of the Republican "Contract with
America" provide for mandatory compensation when
federal government action reduces the value of real
property by ten percent or more.  The terms of such
compensation are spelled out in recent legislation such as
HR925, "Private Property Protection Act of 1995,"
(Shabman and White, 1995:10) and dozens of similar
bills introduced in U.S. state legislatures.
The analysis of takings that follows may generalize to the
case of Canada and other countries where no similar
Constitutional provisions exist.2  A relevant policy
question in these jurisdictions is whether an analogous
legislative or Constitutional requirement would promote
or impair economic efficiency.  Alternatively, one might
ask what would be the net social benefit or costs of
enacting such a provision.
AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR WATER
POLICY REFORM UNDER THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The legal and economics literature on the topic of
regulatory takings has established various economic
arguments about how the presence of the takings clause
influences the efficiency of resource usage.  This paper
will not restate or re-present those findings from first
principles, but will focus on numerous aspects that most
directly apply to the case of broadly based water policy
reform, and will suggest how some of the generic
arguments that have been developed would apply in this
specific context.
In a very general framework, one might suppose that the
public managers or custodians of surface and
groundwater resources take as their objective the
maximization of the gains to society (expressed as some
appropriately discounted net present value) from all
current and future uses of that resource, both private and
public.  Whereas the size and distribution of these gains
will, in general, be important, the analysis presented here
will focus on the former; that is, on the economic
efficiency objectives associated with the resource use.
Ordinarily, the resource managers and political agents
charged with this responsibility will pursue their objective
by maintaining, on their books, some portfolio of
legislation and regulations.  These could include
provisions for alternative resource allocation rules and
institutional mechanisms, various forms of taxation,
subsidization, public provision, enforcement, monitoring,
and so on.  Over time, the management strategy that is
followed might require changes, in the small or in the
large, to the regulatory framework, and sometimes these
regulatory changes could give rise to a claim for
compensation on the grounds that they represent a taking.
The Constitutional requirement for compensation
provides one specific operational constraint, then, on the
actions of the managers.  That is, they are to maximize
the social gains from current and future uses of)in this
case)water resources, subject to the requirement that
where their actions give rise to a taking they must pay
just compensation.  This type of constraint will add to the
existing set of constraints under which either the
managers or the politicians are operating.  Other
examples include various forms of annual budgetary or
budget-balancing requirements, fiscal constraints within
their agency, and other legislative and Constitutional
restrictions on their actions.  Thus, when a takings
provision is viewed as yet another type of constraint on
public policy, the provision may or may not turn out to be
the binding or most restrictive one in a given situation.
The policy reforms that are constrained by the existence
of a takings provision might cause increases or decreases
in three distinct types of values related to the resource use
in question: (i) the social net benefit (or broadly based
gained to society including non-monetary effects) that
will be of primary interest to policy makers; (ii) changes
in private property values that would trigger liability for
takings compensation; and, (iii) other effects on
individual's economic well-being, including landowners,
tenants, consumers, laborers and others.  In general, the
existence of a takings provision cannot ensure that the
changes in these three types of values will be of the same
magnitude or even in the same direction.
When one wishes to assess the effects of constraining
resource policy makers, such as by the use of takings
legislation, it is important to realize that the policy
decisions taken are, in principle, motivated by social
benefits from the use of watershed resources where these
may differ from private or market values.  A policy
reform that provides many non-market benefits to society
may or may not cause these social gains to be reflected in
private property values.  Indeed, the market values of
private lands might rise or fall when some policy reform
is undertaken.  Whether a specific policy reform provides
more benefits than costs to society as a whole will depend
on such features as potential uses of water that it allows,
and the social discount rate that is appropriate for
comparing future policy benefits with short term costs of
the policy.
One interpretation of the takings clause would be a
requirement that the market's valuation of any
individual's potential use of water and land resources
after a policy change must meet or exceed its value before
that change, or else a liability to compensate exists.
When land markets are subject to any of a long list of
sources of market failure, the changes in these private
valuations will not necessarily be the same as the changes
in the social values that motivated them.  These private
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land values might be described as the present value of the
after-tax flow of private benefits that the (marginal)
market investor could derive from each legal parcel of the
individual's land, given access to the water allocations
under a specific resource policy regime.  That is, changes
in land and water rights values are determined by how the
marginal investor could use them, and not necessarily by
how the current owner does use them.
Careful definition of any capital gains or losses due to a
policy reform must distinguish, therefore, among changes
in social values (which in aggregate will have motivated
the reforms); changes in real estate market values (which
define the magnitude of any compensation payable); and,
changes in private valuations placed on the land in
question by the current landowners.  From an efficiency
perspective, the latter are largely irrelevant for the
formation of policy or compensation.3  "Just
compensation" in this case will not necessarily reimburse
individuals fully for changes in their personal or intrinsic
valuations.  Since takings compensation is directed at
landowners, it cannot compensate, for example, long term
tenants caught off guard by a sudden change in resource
policy, nor can it compensate consumers and third parties
who might bear some of the incidence of any cost
increases, for example.
One might also note briefly some of the other established
arguments about the efficiency effects of the takings
provision as they would apply to the example of water
policy reform.  (See Blume and Rubinfeld (1987); Farber
(1992); and Rose-Ackerman (1992); for an elaboration of
the following three arguments and others).  For example,
absent such a provision, landowners may underinvest in
land improvements due to their own fears, or those of
capital markets, that land and investment values might
subsequently fall due to an uncompensated regulatory
taking of irrigation water.  (Conversely, with a takings
clause, some landowners might overinvest as viewed from
a social perspective, even when they fully and correctly
expect some impending regulatory taking to occur, since
the individuals expect to be fully indemnified for all
ensuing losses.)
Proposed reforms that would maximize broadly defined
social welfare might not receive legislative approval in a
direct or representative democracy whose decision rules
are incapable of trading off the intensity of voters'
preferences.  Consider a case where the majority might
lose a little in order that the minority would gain much
more.  With a Constitutional assurance of just
compensation, the majority is more likely to allow a water
reform policy with such a distributional profile to
proceed.
Having viewed a number of potential efficiency effects of
regulatory takings in the large, it may now prove
instructive to examine a number of specific and related
efficiency effects that are encountered "in the small;" that
is, in the specific context of water policy reform.  The
following assessment of takings as it relates to integrated
water policy reform will show that, in the specific context
of water allocation, there arises an even richer variety of
influences of public compensation on economic
efficiency.
WATER POLICY REFORM AND THE EFFICIENCY
EFFECTS OF COMPENSATION-IN-KIND
One of the key insights of this paper is that, in the context
of a broad water policy reform where the takings
provision would apply, both the quantum of damages and
the form of compensation can be largely endogenous to
the policy problem, and that the choice of each can have
important efficiency effects.  That is, some "optional"
elements of a water policy reform package can have
positive effects on the capital value of land, thereby
reducing the magnitude of compensable damages, and, at
the same time, can influence the efficiency of resource
use.  These points will be elaborated using the existing
Alberta water policy as a benchmark.
Consider a landowner/irrigator in Alberta, Canada, who,
under the existing water policy regime, has a "use permit"
to draw up to some maximum annual volume of
groundwater or surface water for irrigation use.  That use
permit has a number of characteristics that give it
monetary value: (i) the permit essentially grants an
appropriative right to use the water at negligible annual
or marginal cost, although ownership of the water
formally rests with the government; (ii) the permit
remains valid for an indefinite term; (iii) the permit
appertains to a specific property and is readily
transferable only with the property, and only for the
specified use; and, (iv) the permit has a certain seniority
date that defines its relative priority to draw "all or none"
of its maximum volume in times of shortage.  At the
same time, (v) the permit prohibits short term or long
term transfers of water to other users or uses, either with
or without remuneration; (vi) in an average year there is
excess demand for water for irrigation use, and (vii) there
are various expectations about the longevity of the current
policy regime.
In such a system, the value of the water permit is
capitalized into the value of the irrigable land to which it
appertains, and the (private) present value of that permit
could be estimated using either hedonic or contingent
valuation methods.  Some elements of a re-designed
water policy could cause this capital value to decrease,
and, were it in the U.S., could give rise to an "inverse
condemnation" action, or claim for public compensation
by a landowner due to a regulatory taking.4  At the same
time, other elements of re-designed water policy could
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increase the value of the water permit, and if present,
could act as "non-monetary compensation" or
"compensation-in-kind" that partially or fully
compensates for any decrease.  Finally, other elements of
a new policy could be calibrated so as to increase or
decrease this capital value, ceteris paribus.  
Consider some examples from various aspects of water
policy change, where (i) tradable permits; (ii) water
pricing; (iii) groundwater and surface water access
provisions; (iv) water banks and facilitative policies; and,
(v) other integrated watershed management initiatives are
considered in turn.  The use of these instruments is
described in Nichols (1992); Rosegrant and Binswanger
(1993); Howe (1994); MacDonnell et al. (1994); and Tsur
and Dinar (1995), among others.  Each item could play a
(calibrated) role in a "package" of water policy reforms.
(i) Tradable permits
A move to a system of tradable permits for water use that
does not tie that water use to specific parcels of land
might increase or decrease the capital value of the initial
bundle of (water entitlements plus land).  The magnitude
of this change in value would depend on numerous other
attributes of the tradable permits that are created.  If
capital appreciation results, it could be used either to
offset capital losses due to other parts of the reform
package, or to facilitate other socially desirable parts of
the reform package that would otherwise give rise to
compensable losses.  Consider various of the attributes or
characteristics that give the tradable permits value.
The term or duration of a permit will be a policy choice,
as will the conditions for allocation in times of shortage
or drought.  Across jurisdictions, surface water
entitlements are often (though not universally) issued
with an indefinite term or duration, and groundwater
permits are sometimes afforded guaranteed minimum use
periods (Gisser, 1994:97).  Alberta's system of seniority
of rights provides one system of allocating in times of
shortage, yet other alternatives include proportional
rationing, or using pricing as a rationing mechanism.  If
the seniority system is to be maintained, rights which are
traded could maintain their current seniority date, or their
seniority could be reduced in some specified fashion.
A move to tradable rights might present an opportunity to
reduce the stock of rights outstanding, such as by taxing
back some portion of every reported trade.  For example,
proposed reforms in Alberta would have some form of
"transfer reduction factor" that would allow authorities to
reclaim (without specific compensation) ten percent of
rights privately traded for reassignment to instream flow
needs or for other higher valued uses.  This feature would
potentially increase the efficiency of water use and could
be accommodated without specific monetary
compensation provided there are enough positive features
of the reforms to prevent land values from falling.
Numerous features of new tradable rights that can
potentially increase capital values and increase efficiency
include increasing permit holders' flexibility to respond
to changing water needs.  Simplifying any registration
and approval process for trades; enabling short term as
well as long term (temporary versus permanent) trades;
increasing the allowable distances over which one can
trade; and allowing trades that involve a change of timing
or intended purpose of water use would all qualify.5
Other, more institutional, features of new tradable
permits might be under government control.  Consider
such examples as defining whether water trades are
taxable supplies for the purposes of consumption taxes;
whether the proceeds from such trades are taxable as
income or capital gain; and whether the rights that are
issued shall be treated as real property eligible for seizure
or forfeiture by the courts or creditors.  In the Alberta
context, this might also include redefining the rights
holders to be owners (rather than users) of water drawn
under current entitlements.
(ii) Water pricing
Situations could arise where water pricing is used in
addition to, or in place of, a system of tradable rights, and
where such pricing promotes the efficient use of water.
For example, systems of peak load pricing and priority
pricing may serve as ways of rationing water in times of
shortage, and may generate quantity allocations that
dominate (on efficiency grounds) those resulting from
allocation by seniority, for example.  The design or
reform of pricing policies could influence the nature of
any compensation otherwise payable to landowners by
government.
The market values of land and water will be influenced by
the principles underlying the pricing system that is used,
where historical approaches might include variants of
marginal cost pricing, average cost pricing, or pricing
with specific revenue-raising objectives.  Prices for water
use might also be subject to various market controls, such
as minimum or maximum allowable prices.  Some
jurisdictions may also have the authority to introduce
other capital levies and assessments, such as those related
to capital and infrastructure investments.  In Alberta,
there are proposals to allow some, as yet unspecified,
form of water prices or charges, which will in general
contribute to any claim that the policy reform package
represents a regulatory taking.  In other jurisdictions with
a history of water use charges, price reforms could
diminish or offset such claims.
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(iii) Groundwater and surface water access provisions
There may be a number of other features related to
ground and surface water supply or access that fall under
public control and whose reform could serve the dual
pur poses of efficiency enhancement  and
compensation-in-kind.  Alberta, for example, maintains
co-existing appropriative and riparian rights systems
where some holders of appropriative rights might suffer
future injury if increasing quantities of surface or
groundwater are exploited by landowners exercising
riparian rights.  The conversion to a system based solely
on appropriative rights could be efficiency enhancing and
could represent a form of compensation-in-kind to
existing holders of appropriative rights.
Depending on the rationing rules that will apply in times
of shortage, holders of appropriative rights might benefit
from reducing any policy uncertainty regarding future
rights that might be issued.  Governments could commit,
however credibly, to some limited schedule of future
changes to the rights regime in place and to a specific
policy governing future expansions or contractions in the
quantities of rights that will be outstanding.  This might
take the form of periodic policy reviews or sunset clauses.
Equally important could be a legislative commitment
requiring the government to acquire through purchase,
any rights that public agencies might require for
appropriative or instream flow uses of water, where the
alternative policy might feature various forms of
exemptions for public uses.
Users of water will be concerned about characteristics
such as system reliability and water quality, where these
will usually be beyond the individual's control.  For
groundwater users sharing an aquifer, there will be
concern about water depth and water quality as reflected
in whether and when a steady state rate of withdrawal is
expected to be attained.  Thus, for both surface and
groun dwate r  a n o t h er  way of pr o v i di n g
efficiency-enhancing compensation-in-kind will be to
improve system design and operation)including an
enhanced regime of monitoring and enforcement)so that
reliability and quality standards are improved or assured.
This might include provision of some form of public
insurance against users' losses due to "upstream" water
system failure where this insurance is otherwise
unavailable from private insurers.
Users will be influenced by any other provisions that
influence their access to water under appropriative or
riparian rights they hold.  For example, much has been
made of the way that some jurisdictions maintain a
" b e n e f i c i a l  u s e "  p r o v i s i o n  o f  t h e
"use-it-(properly)-or-lose-it" variety which may place in
jeopardy the existing rights of any holders who would
offer up rights for short term or long term reassignment.
Removing or re-writing these provisions can improve the
efficiency of water use and decrease any other capital
losses occasioned by water policy reform.  Some
jurisdictions might have various conservation standards
in place that mandate or prohibit certain technologies,
such as irrigation sprinkler efficiency or canal design and
maintenance standards.  Where these standards are made
superfluous by other conservation-promoting features of
the water quality reforms, their elimination might favor
some individuals.
(iv) Water banks and other facilitative policies
If the move to a system of market-based water
reallocations does not seem likely to generate a sufficient
frequency or quantity of trades and reallocations of water,
as may often be the case, there may be scope for
establishing a privately or publicly operated market
intermediary, operating as a water bank (Howe, 1994;
MacDonnell et al., 1994).  There will be potential for a
water bank to increase the value of rights by reducing the
transactions costs faced by potential sellers and buyers,
especially where immediacy is important or where there
are relatively small volumes at stake.  A related efficiency
effect may come from providing water owners with an
immediate source of short term financial liquidity when
credit is otherwise constrained.  There may be an added
incentive for individuals to supply water when they see it
as a solution to cash flow constraints.
With water banks, as with other forms of water
organization and management, there will be some policy
latitude for assigning legal and financial responsibility for
operating these systems, including responsibility for costs
associated with metering, monitoring, enforcement, and
so on.  Not all of the alternatives will be equivalent in
their effect, where systems that impose broadly-based
joint-and-several liability may decrease individual's
willingness to participate or to bear these risks.  Where
these policies are expressed as laws and regulations, there
will be scope for choosing the liabilities and penalties for
misuse and overuse, and the procedures and forum for
prosecuting such actions.
(v) Other integrated watershed management initiatives
There are a number of other components of a package of
water policy reforms that are consistent with an
integrated approach to management of the entire
watershed, and which go beyond issues of surface or
groundwater allocation per se.  These include the
allocation of water to hydroelectricity and petroleum
industry users and uses; instream flows and wetlands
needs; and water quality concerns such as salinity and
wastewater management.  Each will be discussed briefly.
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Once one assumes a broader, watershed perspective on
allocation issues, it becomes clear that there may be scope
for beneficial changes in the interseasonal use of water,
such as through changing the periods of hydroelectric
reservoir storage and draw down in a given river system.
Depending on the direction of the proposed changes,
landowners who currently are allowed use of surface
water for irrigation may receive a capital gain or loss
from irrigation season supply changes.  Where, as in
Alberta, there is an active petroleum industry that uses
surface and other waters for the purpose of enhanced oil
recovery within specific watersheds, these uses and return
flows can be made to fall within or beyond any set of
policy reforms that is to be implemented.  Following a
more integrated or encompassing approach to the
allocation of all such water might well provide gains to
downstream users and offset other compensation
requirements.
Any move to increase minimum flows for various
instream needs may require restrictions on current
upstream uses and may give rise to takings claims.  The
same may be true of new water assignments for wetlands
and estuary maintenance, especially where these policy
changes also restrict the other drainage and land use
practices that adjoining landowners may employ.  All the
same, the allocation of water to these purposes may not
represent high rates of consumptive use; that is, these
uses may have high return flows which become available
elsewhere in the system.  There may be some "up side" to
increased instream flows, such as increased quantities
and improved reliability of surface flows for downstream
users within the same jurisdiction.  Increased upstream
takings compensation and decreased downstream takings
compensation may be largely offsetting.
Proposals are being considered and implemented for
salinity management and wastewater recycling in
jurisdictions other than Alberta, and these may eventually
have some role in integrated watershed management in
Alberta too.  For example, a policy change that promotes
trading of surface water and water permits might be
paralleled by a system requiring a landowner to possess
a (tradable) permit to discharge effluents with specific
salt loads or concentrations (including irrigation runoff).
Such a restriction on saline effluents might be seen as a
regulatory taking by some users, depending on how it was
implemented.  All the same, another group, such as
downstream urban and agricultural water users might be
clear beneficiaries of such a policy package.  The decision
to restrict these saline discharges might prevent some
other (compensable) decline in downstream land values.
In the case of wastewater recycling, such as for
non-potable uses and for groundwater recharge, there is
clear potential for the creation of water quantity gains for
those who will have access to the new treated flows for
specific uses (McClurg, 1995).  Similarly, there might be
quality losses of some perceived degree for those who will
continue to draw historical quantities from the water
source that has been augmented.  Under a takings regime
there may be an extra incentive to introduce recycling
programs of this type as part of a package of other
reforms, provided they meet the test of enhancing
economic efficiency.  Once again, the water supplies
made available may provide low-cost yet valuable
compensation-in-kind where monetary compensation
would otherwise be required.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Two concluding observations follow from the foregoing.
The first is that, in general, governments will also be
interested in the equity, fairness, and distributional effects
of the policy reforms they enact, where these have not
received attention here.6  Whether or not the
compensation requirement represented by the takings
provision "improves" the distribution of income in a
particular jurisdiction will depend on how that society
views the prior distribution, and on whether the
compensation provided over- or under-compensates for
the wealth effects it causes.  Recall that the compensation
requirement is based on property values per parcel, where
landowner income and welfare levels may change
relatively more or less than property values.
The second observation is that each jurisdiction will have
greater or fewer "degrees of freedom" to substitute
efficiency-enhancing compensation-in-kind for the
monetary compensation that it might otherwise have to
provide as a result of pursuing water and resource policy
reform.  Presumably, those jurisdictions that do not have
well developed water markets and institutions have the
greatest latitude for exploiting such compensation-in-kind
strategies, and at the same time might face some of the
largest compensation liabilities since water policy
changes and land values may be highly correlated.  In a
"nearly first-best" world, policy-makers will be in the
position of having exploited nearly all of the
efficiency-enhancing elements of a broadly-based water
policy, and they will be approaching the optimum value
of the relevant social objective function.  Eventually, for
them, monetary compensation will be the highest-valued
(or least-cost) form of compensation at the margin, and
its use will be recommended when water resources are to
be reallocated.
What these examples illustrate is that policy designers
will have, within bounds, the ability to choose what the
net decrease (or increase) in capital values will be when
undertaking broadly-based policy reform.  Moreover,
where liability for compensation does exist, there may be
scope to provide it as efficiency-improving
compensation-in-kind, as part of the policy package.
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From the perspective of the affected landowners, and
from the perspective of the policy makers with an
efficiency objective, compensation, be it in cash or
in-kind, may well serve as a catalyst to enacting policy
changes that yield efficiency gains.
NOTES
* The author gratefully acknowledges financial support
from Environment Canada   through the University-
Based Research Program on Economic Instruments.
The views expressed here are not necessarily those of
the Department of Environment Canada.  Any errors
or omissions are the author's alone.
1 Innes' examination of recent cases focuses mainly on
Dolan v. City of Tigard   (U.S. S. Ct. No. 93-518, June
24, 1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
(U.S. S. Ct. No. 91-453, June 29, 1992); and, Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission (483 U.S. 825,
1987).
2 There is ample Canadian precedent for public
compensation to be offered to asset owners harmed by
broadly based public policy change, even where that
change would not represent a taking per se.  Such
compensation has been offered voluntarily by
government even in a fiscal environment that features
a renewed effort to reduce public deficits and debt.
One recent example includes (voluntarily-enacted)
Canadian federal government compensation to owners
of western grain lands whose real property values have
fallen due to the elimination of federal rail
transportation subsidies.  Another example is found in
the Atlantic fishery, where numerous fishing vessels
have been idled by the long term (federal) closure of
various fisheries undertaken to preserve commercial
fish stocks.  In this instance, vessel owners who have
suffered capital losses (manifest in the market values
of boats and licences) are eligible to benefit from
federal buy-back schemes for fishing licences, thus
partly compensating and facilitating the owners'
formal exit from the industry.
What is less clear is whether other Canadian agencies
charged with water policy reform)agencies found
mostly at the province level)would feel bound or
constrained by such precedents or tradition to provide
compensation if proposed water policy reform were
expected to reduce land values.
3 Market values may change more or less than the
private valuations of the current landowners, due to
differences in expectations about prices and
technology, and due to differences in such factors as
discount rates and marginal tax rates, for example.
4 Of course, the absence of a takings clause in Canada
could be responsible for current under investment as
the markets await the specific details of promised
reforms.
5 One prerequisite to allowing such flexibility would be
the redefinition of water rights to represent net or
consumptive usage (gross water withdrawals)over
which  Alberta use permits are currently
defined)minus estimated return flows), where only the
net portion is tradable.  This reduces any direct harm
that might be caused by the trades to third parties who
rely on the return flows to local groundwater or
surface watercourses.
6 There may be separate societal concerns for procedural
fairness as well as for fairness of the resulting income
or welfare levels.  Presumably the former concerns
would align more closely with requiring full
compensation for regulatory takings than would the
latter.
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